Changing requirements
The article says that blame for the delay in the LCA programme needs to be apportioned equally between various agencies involved, such as ''the Aeronautical Development Agency, Defence Research and Development Organisation, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, and even the IAF, which has frequently changed requirements of weapons and electronic warfare midway, have to share the blame''.

Sure, playing the blame game is so easy. But what happens worldwide? What do similar organisations around the world, such as the USAF or US Navy or US Army do with their programmes?

The question is, why not? Life is dynamic - scenarios change overnight. War strategies and battlefield scenarios have changed dramatically since 1983. Should the DRDO have stuck to the scenarios as they existed 25 years ago, and rendered the LCA obsolete even before it went into production?

Obsolescence
The article points out that the IAF has placed an order for only 20 aircraft even though early projections were for 220 aircraft for the IAF and the Indian Navy. It also says that the IAF is worried whether ''the LCA will be a top-notch fighter once it is ready.''

The 20 limited series production aircraft order from the Indian Air Force is an initial order. Any order for a new fighter aircraft is invariably for at least 40. A naval version is also under development and an initial order from the Indian Navy is also very likely. A naval version will allow our Air Defence Ship, currently under construction at the Kochi shipyards, to carry a larger complement of fighters onboard, as compared to the larger Mig-29Ks that are currently scheduled to operate only from the INS Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov).   
 
As for worries about the LCA not being a top-notch fighter when finally ready, how different is this predicament that from the Eurofighter? By the time the Tranche 3 Eurofighter achieves full operationalisation, America's F-22 and JSF-35 programmes will already have overtaken it technologically. So, no surprises if the same is true for the LCA.

The point of trying to develop the LCA indigenously was not merely to supply aircraft to the IAF and the navy. Just as the Europeans have used the Eurofighter to develop their technologies for next generation projects, the Indian defence R&D establishment has sought to use the LCA as a platform on which to develop several technologies for the future.

The Europeans know that if there is a political rift with the Americans, they will find themselves up a creek without a paddle. The development of top-notch technology through the Typhoon programme gives them independence from US hegemony.

It would, therefore, be wrong to look upon the LCA merely as a fighter-manufacturing programme. It is in fact a unique test bed for the development of aerospace technologies that will take us to an acceptable level of competence in this field. It is a fighter programme, a technology demonstrator and a technology generator, all at the same time.

Upon maturity, the programme may serve the purpose it was designed for, which is to fight - or it might not. That wouldn't matter. By then it would have developed enough technologies to provide a technology base for our own medium combat aircraft (MCA) programme.

The MCA is India's own fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) programme. Though we have a pact with the Russians to co-develop an FGFA with them, the MCA is our fallback. If and when the Russians act tough and repeat a Gorshkov on this programme, we shouldn't find ourselves scrounging around for the required technology.

By the time the LCA achieves maturity it would have already paid back in full, by way of technologies and expertise that it would have generated over the life of its programme.

For that matter, domestic orders aren't the only option for such a project. Pompous though it may sound, there is a possibility that smaller countries may opt for something like the LCA, which for them may well be a more comfortable, manageable aircraft, both in terms of cost and technology. Not every country will be interested in the F-22 Raptor, purchasing a squadron of which could very likely wipe out half, or more, of some national economies.

If India builds its own technology capabilities, who loses? It's the arms merchants of the world. So, come events like the DefExpo in New Delhi, they would love to have some mainline newspapers do some DRDO bashing. That can reinforce some myths about Indian R&D and help them sell some of their wares. But there is no reason we should fall for these ploys.

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