India is scheduled to commence consultations in Vienna with the international Atomic energy Association from today to draft a template of an India-specific Additional Protocol for inspection of its civilian nuclear power plants.

The IAEA board of governors is meeting on 1 August to discuss the India-specific safeguards agreement.

India will begin its mandatory consultation process on the Additional Protocol with IAEA, in accordance with the Indo-US joint statement on civil nuclear cooperation of 18 July 2005. The additional protocol will be instrumental in enabling the IAEA to carry out its supervisory mandate.

According to Anil Kakodkar, chairman, Atomic Energy Commission,  Indian negotiators will work out details on a template of the additional protocol, which will be in addition to the India-specific safeguards agreement, said, adding that the details of the Additional Protocol would be unique to India.

IAEA has two templates of additional protocols - one for nuclear weapons countries (P-5) and the other for non-nuclear weapon states.

Additional Protocol or the Model Protocol of IAEA INFCIR 540 is additional to the agreement(s) between NPT state(s) and the IAEA for having safeguards agreement in order to strengthen and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

A N Prasad, former director, Bhabha Atomic Energy Agency and a safeguards and inspection specialist said India's case marks the first time that the IAEA has ever conceded a recognition of being a nuclear weapon state, in any document, albeit indirectly, makint it necessary for the creation of a new template for an Additional Protocol.

According to safeguards experts, there is a possibility that the IAEA board of governors might insist that an India-specific 'An Additional Protocol' also be signed along with the safeguards agreement to enable inspection of those nuclear units India has declared as being for civillian use.

India has so far been opposing the Model Additional Protocol since its introduction by the Agency in late 1990s saying it was intrusive and discriminatory  By having country-specific 'An Additional Protocol', India will not experience the intrusive "Additional Protocol" which is implemented for countries like Iraq where the entire country is under environment surveillance and monitoring.

Since India is a de facto weapon state, INFCIR 540, meant for non-weapon state(s) may not be directly applicable to India, Prasad said adding that some exceptional condition may be made.

Earlier India, Israel and Pakistan had not opted for additional protocols since they were not signatory to any NPT safeguards agreement with IAEA. But now for India it becomes mandatory to generate an India-specific Additional Protocol with IAEA, Prasad said.

According to the separation plan unveiled by Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh in March 2006, 14 out of 22 of the country's nuclear power plants will be under IAEA safeguards and, therfore, open to IAEA for inspection.

So far India has already placed six of its reactors under IAEA safeguards -- two at Tarapur in Maharashtra, two at Kota in Rajasthan and two Russian-designed reactors, which are under advanced state of construction at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu. The reactors under construction are "facility specific".

The IAEA agreement will form the basis for approaching Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to remove the restrictions on nuclear trade with India and the bilateral agreement with the US in the form of the 123 Agreement which gives exemption to India for nuclear commerce with that country.

Though the IAEA agreement originated as a requirement set forth by the US to have an Indo-US nuclear agreement, it has much deeper implications in the international context, Iyer added. Even Russia, has said that for future reactors to be set up, an agreement with IAEA is required. The IAEA and NSG agreements will lead to several bilateral agreements with countries such as France and Russia in the future.

M R Iyer, chairman, accelerator safety committees, Atomic Regulatory Board, and former instruments specialist and safeguards inspector for the IAEA, said the implementation of the IAEA agreement will take several years, since "providing safeguard coverage from scratch for 14 installations is a mind boggling task for the IAEA".

Iyer, one of the inspectors for North Korea facilities, pointed out that "safeguardability" of a plant means nothing unless it is organised from the beginning as the input and output of fissile materials had to be reconciled by containment and surveillance techniques.

Moreover, the IAEA would need a  Member State Support Programme, since the Agency has to depend on member states to develop and perfect both hardware and software for implementation of safeguards. He said though IAEA has infrastructure to carry out safeguard inspection and analysis, it does not have any for development of the hardwares and software.