A verdict born of pain
15 Nov 2004
George
Bush's second victory has thrown liberal America into
despair. When he won in 2004, it dismissed this as an
aberration made possible by the hitherto unsuspected flaws
in the American democratic system. While Jeb Bush (Florida's
governor) exploited these to give Florida to his brother,
the Republican majority in the Supreme Court politicised
the rule of law and prevented a recount of the vote in
Florida.
When Bush began, cold-bloodedly and without provocation,
to plan an invasion of Iraq regardless of the cost in
(Iraqi) lives, they railed at the ascendancy of the neo
conservatives and accused them of having staged
a coup and hijacked American democracy. The implication
was clear. This was an aberration and would one day be
put right.
When Bush bungled the management of the country and showed a cavalier disregard for responsible government on every issue from Iraq to the budget deficit they rejoiced and began to hope that his days were numbered.
When Kerry failed to attack Bush on what was rapidly emerging as his weakest point the rising body count in a pointless war and instead allowed himself to be put on the defensive over his flip-flops on Iraq and his war record in Vietnam, they railed against his pusillanimity and began to say that he lacked the qualities of a leader.
When record numbers of young people and blacks registered
themselves to vote, their spirits rose, for this was a
sure sign of acute disenchantment with the incumbent regime.
When record numbers went to the polls, their spirits rose even higher. On the afternoon of November 2, as the first exit poll results showed that most of the new voters were voting for Kerry, they began to hope that the aberration that the Bush Presidency represented was coming to an end.
Therefore when, despite the record turnout, Bush won by one of the largest margins in American history, it was not only their hopes that were dashed. Some of their most deeply cherished assumptions about their country and about American democracy also came down in ruins.
President Bush did not win because Kerry could not bring out the democratic voters. He won in spite of Kerry's success in doing so. He won because even larger numbers of new voters came out to vote for him. They belonged to the Christian evangelical right. They voted for Bush because they wanted to turn the clock back. They wanted to prevent abortion; to prevent same sex marriages; to allow Christian prayers in public, i.e state schools.
They
approved of the curtailment of the democratic rights of
individuals if this was necessary to make the masses feel
safer. They did not mind that their President had lied
to them, or at least allowed them to draw the wrong conclusions,
in order to take them into war. They did not mind if habeas
corpus was suspended and new interpretations were
given to law, by executive order, to permit torture and
sexual molestation of prisoners who had not been charged
with, let alone convicted of, anything.
They were, in short, people who were not guided by reason
but swayed by passion. They were not looking forward to
the technology dominated future but yearning to go back
to the God-fearing past. For them rationality was at a
severe discount.
Only
blind faith in God, in Bush, and in the American flag,
mattered. They hankered for a past when life was simpler,
and values were more clearly defined. They yearned for
simple solutions to intractable problems and did not mind
if their government took short cuts to get to them. They
longed for the conformism of the past and the freedom
from doubt that it gave them. They took shelter in religion
from a world that they no longer understood. They distrusted
the big cosmopolitan cities. They came from middle America,
from the smaller towns and in even greater numbers from
the rural areas. Together, they made up as many as 41
per cent of the voters. They were, in short, the western
answer to Osama bin Laden. On November 2, they cracked
the liberal foundations upon which American democracy
had rested for more than a hundred years.
A silent revolution
What America has experienced is not a temporary fit of
insanity but a silent, non-violent revolution that has
shifted the locus of American politics many, many degrees
to the right. This is no temporary swing. It has brought
home to the democrats how dangerously out of touch they
had become with the mood of middle America when they blithely
endorsed gay marriages and womens' right to choose. As
The Guardian perceptively commented, the biggest
loser in this election has not been John Kerry but Hillary
Clinton. For she represents everything that a majority
of the American electorate has rejected.
Where has this revolution sprung from? The answer can be given in one word: "globalisation". In the last four decades while New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles have become glittering 'global cities', most of middle America has turned into a 'rust belt' with silent mills, dying towns, boarded up homes and unswept pavements.
Blue-collar jobs have vanished. Trade unions have become defunct, and the security these gave to the working class has become a distant memory. Service sector jobs are still to be had, and in many areas the service sector has created more jobs than the manufacturing sector has lost. But the drop in status even for those fortunate to land one of these new jobs has been frightful. To cite but one example: in 1995 Long Island, outside New York, created more jobs than it lost. But the average salary in the jobs closed was $42,700 a year, while the average salary in the new jobs was $18,000.
The trauma is all the deeper because more and more of
the available service sector jobs are being taken by immigrants.
In the mid-west this is a new and unsettling phenomenon.
Add to this the fact that more and more of the places
in the top universities and in the largest corporations
are going to another group of recent immigrants, the Asians,
and it is hardly surprising that a large part of white
male America believes that its future is being stolen
from it. For many of its members there is nowhere to go
but the past.
Far from being unique, the shift to the right in America
is part of a far more widespread shift taking place in
all the industrialised countries of Europe. In France
Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the fascist national
Front got 0.74 per cent of the vote in 1974. In the last
Presidential election he got the largest number of votes
in the first ballot. Austria and Denmark passed under
far right regimes in the '90s.
In Germany the far right neo-Nazi party has captured almost a fifth of the vote. The main difference between America and Europe is that in the latter the far right remains, by and large at the fringe of politics, while in the former it has infiltrated the Grand Old Party and captured the State. The credit for keeping the Right at bay in Europe may go to its valiant efforts to retain as much as possible of its social democracy and welfare capitalism for as long as possible, instead of letting the market have its untrammelled way.
Since there is no way of halting globalisation and the hollowing out of industry in the older industrialised countries, there is also no way, at least in the perceptible future, of bringing the political pendulum back to what used to be the centre.
The consequences of the shift for American domestic and foreign policy are disturbing and unpredictable. Americans are swinging right out of pain. And the neo-conservatives are skilfully diverting the rage it has given birth to in the people away from the giant corporations whose decisions are causing it towards strangers in other countries whose lives are even more miserable than theirs. Within America the battle has turned into one between reason and fear, and fear is winning. But with every one of its victories the public space open for democratic debate and contention is getting more restricted. As for the rest of the world, Bush's victory will reinvigorate the drive towards empire and therefore hasten the end of the Westphalian order and the return, after four hundred years, to a Hobbesian world dominated by war, fear and uncertainty.
This
is very far from the peaceful, democratic and prosperous
world that Francis Fukuyama had predicted, to world-wide
acclaim, in his essay, 'The End of History', fifteen
years ago.
*
The author, a noted analyst and commentator, is a former
editor of the Hindustan Times, The Economic
Times and The Financial Express,
and a former information adviser to the prime minister
of India. He is the author of several books including,
The Perilous Road to the Market: The Political Economy
of Reform in Russia, India and China, and
Kashmir 1947: The Origins of a Dispute, and a
regular columnist with several leading publications.