Towards a new Indian approach in Afghanistan

India's foreign policy towards Afghanistan urgently requires attention. Over the course of the past year, India's fortunes in Afghanistan have suffered a reversal. In the context of the London conference where India's concerns in Afghanistan were relegated to lower priority by the governments shaping the agenda, India needs to depart from a reactive and passive approach and make a sustained commitment of resources towards proactive initiatives in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is vital to India's interests and India should have an independent, long-term policy towards the country and its demographics.

India's engagement with Afghanistan from 1947 till date has been greatly affected by its relationship with the Pashtuns and given the zero-sum nature of the current conflict, India's support for the Northern Alliance during the civil war and the current government has led to misperceptions and disenchantment with India among sections of the Pashtuns. This needs to be a serious issue of reflection for Indian decision-making in Afghanistan.

India's interests in Afghanistan are multifaceted. Afghanistan cannot be allowed to be used as a base for anti-India activities by non-state actors.

India has the responsibility to use all its capabilities to maintain stability and foster prosperity in the subcontinent. And given its close historical relations, the interests of the Afghan people are of paramount concern to India. Even Afghans who profess a preference for the Taliban over the Karzai government, do not want a return of the draconian form of sharia law and brutality of the Taliban years. India thus faces a distinct dilemma vis-à-vis the Taliban. Despite the latter being largely an indigenous force, it has for years had a patron-client relationship with Pakistan. Without condoning its extremism, how can India engage it?

To start with, it is worth considering the fact that the Afghan Taliban- Pakistan nexus has more often than not been opportunistic and the former has often double-dealt with Pakistan. India correctly recognises that Taliban cannot be categorised as Good or Bad based on their propensity to violence alone or political ideology alone. And yet, the Taliban is not a monolithic political entity.

The foot soldiers of the Taliban include disaffected, unemployed youth, peasants working part-time, disenfranchised tribes and criminal gangs. Despite Pakistan's ability to affect the intensity of the conflict, there are many factions within the Taliban. Thus, India therefore needs to differentiate its policy depending on the influence, control, allegiance and composition of the different factions.