Multi-role combat aircraft deal: Does the mighty MiG stand a chance?
By Ashwin Tombat | 20 Sep 2007
India's biggest ever global defence tender for the purchase of 126 multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) for $10 billion (Rs42,000 crore), now at the Request For Proposals (RFP) stage, has six main bidders. (See: MRCA RFP: India floats its biggest-ever global tender for jet fighters)
The contenders are:
- Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
- Dassault Rafale
- Eurofighter Typhoon
- Lockheed Martin F-16
- RSK MiG-35
- Saab Gripen
Bidders are to submit technical responses by 3 March 2008, and New Delhi will issue a shortlist after conducting extensive technical and field evaluations of the candidate aircraft. The aircraft are envisaged to have a lifecycle of 40 years from the time of delivery.
The first batch of 18 fighters is to be supplied in a flyaway condition, by 2012. The remaining 108 are to be manufactured in partnership with India's Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) as part of a 50 per cent offsets deal. India holds the option of purchasing an additional 64 fighters under the same terms and conditions.
Will the MiG measure up?
The question is, can the MiG-35 of a weakened, post-cold war Russia that is just rebuilding an economy crippled by suddenly being thrown open after generations of state control, take on its formidable European and American peers? Yes, say Russian experts who are quietly confident that in the event of a fair contest sans big-power political pressures, the MiG-35 has a more than even chance of bagging the MRCA deal.
The multi-role MiG-35 Fulcrum or MiG-35D (two-seater) fighter is a generation 4++ plane. It is a development of the MiG-29K/KUB fighter, which Russia will supply for the Indian aircraft carrier Vikramaditya (formerly Admiral Gorshkov), now under refit at the Sevmashpredpriyatiye production association.
It has a superior combat performance and improved flying characteristics. The onboard radio-electronic equipment includes a fifth-generation information sighting system. The fighter can use rockets and bombs made in Russia as well as in other countries. Its onboard defence system comprises opto-electronic systems for detecting attacking missiles and laser radiation, a radio countermeasures system, and an automatic decoy release mechanism. These novel features enable it to fight successfully in the air and hit coastal and sea targets, at any time of day and night, and in all weather without entering the AD zone.
Not by combat characteristics alone…
But its rivals, too, have impressive features. Combat characteristics alone are unlikely to determine choice of fighter for the Indian Air Force (IAF). There are other reasons that could take priority.
The first is the fact that the MiG will probably be the lowest-priced of all the contenders. This is no reflection of its quality. Soviet and Russian arms have traditionally been lower-priced than their western competitors. Things are changing now that Russia is no longer a socialist country, but it still manages to seriously undercut the opposition.
Another is the fact that most Indian combat aircraft are Soviet- or Russian-made. The IAF has over 500 fighter jets produced in Russia and only 70 French-made Mirage 2000s and British Jaguars, plus 20 or so VTOL Sea Harriers on the Viraat aircraft carrier and at Naval aviation HQ in Goa.
India already makes them
Besides, HAL plants are presently assembling multi-role Su-30MKI fighters under licence from Russia. Indian engineers and technicians are familiar with both Sukhoi and MiG production technology, having produced the MiG-21 earlier. It is so much easier for them to master the assembly and later manufacture MiG-35s under license; one of the tender conditions.
The United States has never given any other country (with the possible exception of Israel) the right to make its planes. In contrast, Russia will be willing to help India with the manufacture of MiG-35s at Indian plants.
The Damocles sword of sanctions
There is one more factor that favours the Russian bid. It is economic, rather than military, technical or political. This is the history of the US State Department which, because of its dissatisfaction for one reason or the other, tends to impose trade sanctions against countries or organisations that override any existing agreements between the two entities.
India has suffered such sanctions for decades. For refusing to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Washington maintained practically no military-technical relations with India until March 2006, when the two countries signed a joint statement on nuclear cooperation.
Even more crippling sanctions were imposed after India exploded nuclear devices in 1998, which again were substantially (but not entirely) withdrawn only in 2006. The US still has a few sanctions standing against this country. What is the guarantee that Washington will not apply sanctions again, if it is displeased by India in the future?
Russia, on the other hand, has never imposed sanctions on India. It is true that for 10 years following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Russian economy shortly after, Indian defence preparedness suffered serious setbacks because Russian arms companies were in limbo and were unable to provide technical support or supply India the spares required for its defence equipment.
But things have now improved and Russian defence companies are aggressively targeting the arms market with an eye on their bottomlines. Their new goal is to be at least as good, if not better than their western counterparts. India has little to fear in the realm of support and supply of spares for its Russian defence purchases.
All's not well on the Russian front
At the same time, defence purchase relations between New Delhi and Moscow are not perfectly smooth. One of the problems is the slow pace at which the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov (to be known as Vikramaditya) is being modernised. Under the contract, it is to be handed over to India in 2008, but is unlikely to be complete before 2010, if not 2012. This has exasperated the Indian Navy and government, although they publicly express their irritation in very mild words.
A few years ago, the Baltiisky Zavod shipyard in St Petersburg delayed the delivery of three frigates — Talwar, Trishul and Tabar — to New Delhi by more than a year, because of problems with the Shtil surface-to-air missile systems.
There is ongoing friction around the modernisation of five Il-38SD maritime surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft. New Delhi is refusing to accept them because its naval aviation pilots say the Morskoi Zmei (Sea Dragon) anti-submarine search and homing system installed on these planes does not meet modern requirements. The Russians say that when the systems were reviewed several months ago, no such questions arose.
Hedging one's bets
Nowadays, New Delhi is pursing a multi-vectored defence policy, which does not limit defence cooperation to one country. Even though Russia has never let India down in serious matters, not putting all one's eggs in the same basket is sensible pragmatism that can prove to be insurance in a crisis.
There are several impressive examples of successful military-technical cooperation between Russia and India in defence matters. The Su-30MKI multi-role fighter planes that India makes under licence from Russia have not yet been deployed by the Russian Air Force. The two countries have a contract for supply and licensed production of state-of-the-art T-90S tanks. Russia has supplied India with surface-to-air missiles and gun systems, including the Smerch multiple launch rocket systems.
BrahMos shows the way
The most impressive cooperative venture between the two countries is the joint venture BrahMos, which produces a supersonic cruise missile of the same name, now being adapted for launching from planes and ships. If the MiG-35 does bag the MRCA deal, this may well be one of its weapon systems.
There is a better than even chance for the Mig-35 to become India's multi-role combat aircraft, if the deal is to be decided purely on feasibility, technical and economic criteria, without opening the Pandora's box of political considerations. The results of the tender will become known only in two years' time. By then, a lot of water will have flowed down both the Brahmaputra and Moskva rivers.