Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström share Economics Nobel

The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for the year 2016 has been awarded to Oliver Hart of the University of Harward, Cambridge and Bengt Holmström of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge for "their contributions to contract theory".

Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström

Their theories "are valuable to the understanding of real-life contracts and institutions, as well as potential pitfalls in contract design," the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences said while announcing the award.

"This year's laureates have developed contract theory, a comprehensive framework for analysing many diverse issues in contractual design, like performance-based pay for top executives, deductibles and co-pays in insurance, and the privatisation of public-sector activities," the jury said.

''Modern economies are held together by innumerable contracts. The new theoretical tools created by Hart and Holmström are valuable to the understanding of real-life contracts and institutions, as well as potential pitfalls in contract design.

''Society's many contractual relationships include those between shareholders and top executive management, an insurance company and car owners, or a public authority and its suppliers. As such relationships typically entail conflicts of interest, contracts must be properly designed to ensure that the parties take mutually beneficial decisions.

This year's laureates have developed contract theory, a comprehensive framework for analysing many diverse issues in contractual design, like performance-based pay for top executives, deductibles and co-pays in insurance, and the privatisation of public-sector activities,'' the Nobel Committee stated.

Citing the example of a company's CEO, Bengt Holmström in the late 1970s demonstrated how a principal (eg, a company's shareholders) should design an optimal contract for an agent (the company's CEO), whose action is partly unobserved by the principal.

Holmström's informativeness principle stated precisely how this contract should link the agent's pay to performance-relevant information. Using the basic principal-agent model, he showed how the optimal contract carefully weighs risks against incentives.

Holmström later generalised these results to situations when employees are not only rewarded with pay, but also with potential promotion.

Similarly, in the late 1980s, Oliver Hart made fundamental contributions to a new branch of contract theory that deals with the important case of incomplete contracts.

''Because it is impossible for a contract to specify every eventuality, this branch of the theory spells out optimal allocations of control rights: which party to the contract should be entitled to make decisions in which circumstances? Hart's findings on incomplete contracts have shed new light on the ownership and control of businesses and have had a vast impact on several fields of economics, as well as political science and law.

''His research provides us with new theoretical tools for studying questions such as which kinds of companies should merge, the proper mix of debt and equity financing, and when institutions such as schools or prisons ought to be privately or publicly owned,'' the committee stated.

Over the last few decades, they have also explored many of its applications. Their analysis of optimal contractual arrangements lays an intellectual foundation for designing policies and institutions in many areas, from bankruptcy legislation to political constitutions.